

Rudolph Nyamudo

**Border and Poor Migrants:
An African Moral
Philosophy View**

Abstract

The problem of substantial migration of the poor fleeing their nations into other states has continued, even though some politicians, mostly those in the host nations, are against the immense movement of people on shared state borders. In this philosophical discussion I use South Africa – Zimbabwe boundary, one of the busiest land borders in the continent of Africa and the only point of entry on land between these two African countries, as my main example. By drawing on an ubuntu/hunhu ethic, i.e., an African moral philosophy that is common among the people who live in the Southern region of Africa, I contend with the problem of borders in relation to poor migrants. Firstly, I lay out key facts pertaining to the South Africa - Zimbabwe border regulations, which invite moral reflections. Secondly, I articulate the ubuntu ethic. Finally, on the basis of the ubuntu ethos I propose concrete changes for borders. By engaging the question of borders with African moral philosophy, namely, an ubuntu ethic, and also providing concrete proposals for the problem of the border and the poor migrants, this discussion brings originality to the migration debate.

Keywords: borders, ethics, hunhu/ubuntu, immigration, migrants, poverty

Introduction

International borders are a challenge for a number of people who move across different nations. For the sake of controlling migration, governments across the world demand varying credentials such as passports

(Mongia 1999, 527-528), from those who seek to migrate. “(A) ‘passport’ in the modern sense is, in essence, a document of identity” (Diplock 1946, 52). Additionally, a number of governments demand proof of finances and educational documents from individuals who choose to migrate. However, most states receive migrants without the expected educational certificates (Sebola 2019, 3). Substantial migration of the needy is a problem that involves the moral debate of abolishing and regulating state borders. “(A) regime of verification includes the specific ways in which individual identity is defined, the evidence needed to verify that identity, and the authorities who could ultimately determine an individual’s (official) identity” (Robertson 2010, 247). Notice that state boundaries do not necessarily entail passport control. Further, state borders have existed in moments of history without any passport control (Diplock 1946, 44-45; Gulddal and Payne 2017, 9-13). Should state borders exist? If so, who should be able to pass through and for which reasons?

I use the South Africa – Zimbabwe border as my main example in this essay. The border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, i.e., the Beitbridge port of entry, is one of the busiest land borders on the continent of Africa. However, the Beitbridge port of entry has remained as the only point of entry on land between these two African countries (Curtis 2009, 7; Moyo 2020, 3). I consider whether global justice requires this border to be removed. “Global justice” entails inquiries that “take individual human beings as of primary concern and seek to give an account of what fairness among such agents involves” (Brock and Hassoun 2023). Both South Africa and Zimbabwe control the Beitbridge port of entry.

The question of national borders is currently contentious among worldwide scholars, including those researching on Africa. Among these are Christopher H. Wellman and Phillip Cole (2011), Joseph Carens (1987; 2013), Leonardo D. de Castro and Peter A. Sy (2017), Uchenna Okeja (2021) and Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani (2021). Ani, from Ghana, is one of the African philosophers in favour of closed borders. Focusing on the effects of brain drain resulting from global migration from poor countries, such as Zambia to richer countries in other continents for example the United States of America, Ani (2021, 182) presents an argument that attempts “to protect the economic and political health of migrant-sending countries”. Though some African scholars writing on migration have challenged border regulations of host states (Mbembe 2017; 2019; Moyo

2020), I instead argue for an application of an ubuntu ethic to the issue, making some concrete prescriptions for change in policy while ultimately retaining borders. The practical changes that I propose include creation of multiple ports of entry, removal of the requirement of showing educational credentials, use of a good conduct certificate, and criteria for dealing with individuals who break the law by crossing the state boundaries.

Other scholars such as Anke Graness (2019), Mokoko Sebola (2019), and Mutsa Murenje (2020) have invoked ubuntu in the migration discussion to shed light on how states can adopt policies that exhibit hospitality towards refugees and migrants. In contrast to the above intellectuals, I apply the ubuntu ethic to the problem of borders in relationship to poor migrants.

Ubuntu/hunhu is an African philosophy that is common among the people who live in the Southern region of Africa. Christian B.N. Gade (2011) reveals the historical development of the literature on ubuntu in “The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on *Ubuntu*”. Further, Stanlake John Thompson Samkange (1980); Mogobe Bernard Ramose (1999; 2002; 2021), Augustine Shutte (2001), Johann Broodryk (2006); Thaddeus Metz (2007; 2011a; 2022) and Pascah Mungwini (2017) are additional scholars who have contemplated on ubuntu. I highlight that hunhuism, as a philosophy of how to exist together informed by hunhu, that is to say, humanness of a person, captures the basis of morality among the Shona speaking people (Samkange and Samkange 1980; Mungwini 2017, 143). According to my interpretation, hunhu/ubuntu prescribes love (Metz 2022), where love is understood, not as a romantic feeling or a short-lived admiration of another, but rather as an enduring friendly relationship with others that involves sincere identity and solidarity.

I choose to engage African philosophy because an ubuntu ethos is concerned with breaking barriers that limit the accomplishment of loving relationships in society, a *prima facie* attractive moral perspective. I advance the position that one who is loving does not limit avenues that others can use to reach him or her, but instead takes first steps to reach out to those that need relationships. Thus, in response to my question, I make use of the ubuntu ethos to advance the perspective that, although borders ought to exist, they should not be used to hinder the attainment of communal relationships among different individuals, but should be altered to encourage the achievement of such ties.

By engaging the question of borders with African moral philosophy, i.e., ubuntu ethic, this discussion brings originality to the migration debate. Moreover, I provide concrete proposals for the problem of the border and poor migrants. African state borders should continue to exist, but it is important to establish changes that include the removal of laws that discredit poor migrants' worth. Although the practical resolutions I suggest for change on the borders are specifically focused on my main example, i.e., the South Africa - Zimbabwe border, the proposals can correspondingly be applied to a similar border problem on the grounds of an ubuntu ethos.

Next, I provide a brief background of the South Africa - Zimbabwe border. Afterwards, I articulate the ubuntu ethos. Fourthly, I lay out a rationale for keeping borders. In the fifth section I suggest concrete changes to borders. Finally, I conclude the discussion on the border and poor migrants.

1. Brief background of South Africa - Zimbabwe border

In this section, I discuss empirical issues relevant to the contemporary controversies of whether there should be borders and, if so, how they should be regulated. The Zimbabwe - South Africa border, which has a total length of approximately two hundred kilometers (Moyo 2020, 3), is my main example of the problem of borders. After a brief illustration of the background of the South Africa - Zimbabwe border, I show which criteria are currently used to determine who passes through the border. Crossing the Zimbabwe - South Africa border, in both directions, is often determined by one's possession of a passport and visa permits issued to individuals with critical skills. Additionally, I demonstrate what the consequences of using those criteria are to poor migrants by showing problems that the needy migrants encounter because of the restrictive conditions on the state boundaries.

2. Movement of people in precolonial Africa and the question of borders

Could one clearly identify the borders that existed in pre-colonial Africa? Observe that some ancient African societies associated with each other without the limits of borders. For example, the people in the

Shashe-Limpopo basin, including the people of Mapungubwe, the Shona, and the Venda, were connected (Manyanga and Chirikure 2019, 74). Further, Munyaradzi Manyanga and Shadreck Chirikure argue that “it has been demonstrated by many scholars that the archaeology of southern African nations cuts across the modern political boundaries” (Manyanga and Chirikure 2019, 82). Hence, some of the contemporary African borders separate not only people who have lived together for centuries, but also “related communities who share a common past, language, belief systems, norms and values” (Manyanga and Chirikure 2019, 82). In order to shed light on the problem of the current African borders, it is revealing to briefly discuss the notion of friendliness towards migrants in precolonial Africa. People often moved from one location to another.

Precolonial migration in Africa was a consequence of different human needs. Christine Obbo (1979, 227) in *Village Strangers in Buganda Society* points out that migration is not a recent phenomenon in Africa. How should a person respond to famine or threatening hostilities in one's society? For example, struggles that took place within the Zulu state brought about “in the 1820s and 1830s, waves of migration of disaffected groups which established new African states and often came to dominate local populations in the Transvaal, Zimbabwe” and other regions within the African continent (Mackenzie 2005, 23). Hence, precolonial African communities absorbed migrants from other parts of Africa.

Historians have provided many ways of clarifying the “mfecane”, a complex historical issue. The socio-political problems “and violence of the early nineteenth century in southern Africa were the result of a complex interaction between factors governed by the physical environment and local patterns of economic and political organization” (Eldredge 1992, 1). Shaka, one of the kings of the Zulu community (Cobbing 1988, 499; Hamilton 1992, 41), and Moshoeshoe, the king of Lesotho (Prozesky 2016, 10), are some of the African leaders that are often discussed by scholars who study the early history of Southern Africa.

Notice that Moshoeshoe, the African king mentioned above, won voluntary loyalty of his followers (Eldredge 1992, 1). Further, Moshoeshoe “was able to gather together and protect the shattered remnants of the disrupted chiefdoms, and gradually weld them into the Basotho nation of the future” (Prozesky 2016, 10). Hence, Moshoeshoe illustrated “the widespread African belief in the inter-relatedness of humankind” (Proz-

esky 2016, 13). Moshoeshoe's acts towards new members of his society, i.e., people from other kingdoms, demonstrate the African values of ubuntu, hospitality and concern towards others. Although Moshoeshoe's acts towards new members in his society illustrate points where ubuntu as I interpret it was present in pre-colonial Africa, I do not romanticize the tradition by supposing that it was ubiquitous.

Different scholars affirm the perspective that migrants in pre-colonial Africa became part of host communities. Among the scholars writing on the movement of people in ancient Africa is Monica Wilson, a South African anthropologist, who contemplated about strangers in Africa on the basis of archaeological evidence from Nyakyusa, Nguni, and Sotho societies. Wilson argues that the "archaeological evidence points to the arrival of strangers of differing physique with new techniques; and there is a rich and diverse oral tradition of journeys and arrivals" in different African societies (1979, 51). Hence, it is essential to emphasize the idea that migration is not new to the African continent, but an age-old thing encountered in different local societies.

Although strangers in African communities were sometimes received with distrust in particular situations, migration has usually not been understood as a threat to the African communities. For Robin Cohen (2019, 46), numerous early African societies treated "strangers as non-threatening guests", individuals who could become part of the community over time. Cohen's point of view is affirmed by African aphorisms of entertaining visitors that "imposed mutual obligations on guests and hosts" (Cohen 2019, 47). An example is "*Heri yako heri yangu*", a Swahili axiom which translates to, "your joy is my joy". Such an aphorism reflects the existence of hospitality towards individuals who moved from one society to another.

3. Borders in colonial Southern Africa

Most of the current state borders on the African continent are a result of the partitioning of the continent during the colonization period. In the case study under scrutiny, an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Transvaal in the Pretoria Convention set the South Africa/Southern Rhodesia boundary towards the end of the year 1881 (Ndlovu

2012; Rukema and Pophiwa 2020, 277). Continuous negotiations among colonial governments and clashes with local indigenous populations led to changes on the colonial boundaries. Further, towards the end of 1880s and the beginning of 1890s, the African maps for political borders underwent changes in each year (Mackenzie 2005, 10). European states such as Great Britain, France and Portugal competed to possess portions of the territory in Africa. Various scholars use the phrase 'scramble for Africa' to denote the European nations' competing interest for pieces of the African territory (Mackenzie 2005, 11; Fourie 2015, 4; Oduntan 2015, 90; Nwachukwu and Ogundiwin 2020). For the sake of keeping one European state from politically interfering with another, bordered colonial territories were established. Only a few controlled ports of entries were established by the colonial governments.

On the grounds of borders, colonial government leaders established regulations that restricted the movement of people from one African state to another. Focusing on South Africa and Zimbabwe, in 1957 the Limpopo River was affirmed by the government leaders of the Federation of Rhodesia (i.e., Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi) and the Union of South Africa as the official border between the two colonies (Musoni 2012; Rukema and Pophiwa 2020, 277). The movement of people between the two African states, that is, Zimbabwe and South Africa, was conditioned by border regulations and the requirement of documents such as passports. Passports became a common requirement for one to move from one African state to another as they were across all other states outside Africa.

4. Border restrictions in post-colonial Southern Africa

Border regulations have not been removed after African nations got independence, but have actually continued to intensify at the expense of poor migrants. The attainment of independence from colonial governments has led to neither the abolition of borders nor the relaxation of the regulations that disfavour poor migrants. For example, Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique have maintained almost all state boundaries that were established in the continent during the colonization period. However, the issue of colonial

borders has been challenged by Kwame Nkrumah (1969, 25), a prominent Pan-Africanist and influential political leader, and other different African scholars (Mbembe 2017; 2019; Mulindwa 2020, 603; Sanni 2020). Despite the fact that current state boundaries and border rules disfavour poor individuals, most African governments including Zimbabwe and South Africa have not addressed this problem of borders. Rather, new regulations for moving from one African state to another have been put in place. Countries like South Africa currently require migrants who are seeking to cross the border to work or learn in the African nation to have credentials that include educational certificates, finance proofs, health insurances and other documents.

Despite the border regulations that seek to limit the movement of people between countries, substantial migration of the poor fleeing their suffering nations into other states such as South Africa has continued. South Africa is the main destination for numerous Zimbabwean migrants (Crush and Tevera 2010, 4; Chekero and Morreira 2020, 36). The prospect of overcoming poverty motivates a number of poor Zimbabweans to cross the border into South Africa. Skyrocketing inflation, high unemployment, and poverty in Zimbabwe continue to make it difficult for many poor individuals to afford basic necessities.

Moreover, numerous poor individuals who have not reached tertiary education are not able to acquire visas or work permits to cross the border. In countries like South Africa, it is difficult for the poor migrants who lack appropriate education and enough funds to acquire migration documents. Further, visas and work permit fees are costly for the poor migrants. Acquiring documents such as passports or visas in economically depressed countries such as Zimbabwe is a dilemma for the poor. Hence, it is worth considering whether the current criteria of assessing who enters the borders should be changed.

Plausibly, border regulations do not only restrict the movement of people, but also discourage the achievement of friendly relationships among people from different states. Migration regulations in Africa are not only symptoms of the challenge of colonial boundaries, but reinforce the problem of restricting the movement of Africans in the continent (Sanni 2020, 20). Under the current border demands, credentials for traveling from one state to another are prized over the understanding of migrants as individuals to whom society owes hospitality. One who does

not possess the required documentation for crossing the border is often not able to cross the state boundaries in Africa. Achille Mbembe, an African history scholar, argues that “(t)he end of colonial rule has not ushered a new era characterised by the extension of the right to freedom of movement to all” (Mbembe 2017). Think of how different the movement of persons from one place to another was in ancient Africa; temporary or permanent migration was not restricted in pre-colonial African territories, as briefly explained above.

At present, there are a limited number of ports of entry on some African boundaries. Beitbridge is the only point of entry between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Additionally, observe that Beitbridge is a very busy border that facilitates the movement of huge volumes of heavy trucks and passenger vehicles (Curtis 2009, 3-5; Ngarachu *et al.* 2019). It is crucial to consider measures that could improve the movement of needy migrants.

5. *Hunhu/ubuntu*

In this part of the essay, I articulate the ubuntu/hunhu ethic, a relational ethos, which is what I use to evaluate the South Africa - Zimbabwe border. What does it mean to have ubuntu? How should one relate to others? ‘Hunhu/ubuntu’ is an African term that means humanness, and connotes a person who demonstrates good moral behavior in society. The hunhu ethos involves sincere concern and friendliness towards other persons (Samkange and Samkange 1980, 39). Good moral behavior is demonstrated by practical loving relationships with others in the community. Individuals “manifest patterns in their actions which can be judged either as displaying or lacking humanness” (Koenane and Olatunji 2017, 267). Immoral acts hinder the attainment of loving relationships with others in society.

I choose to work with ubuntu in this research because the African ethos stresses the idea that one ought to overcome any form of disunion or separation from others to achieve genuine communal relationships that honor people’s dignity, i.e., persons’ capacity to engage in loving relationships with others in the community (Metz 2022). According to the ubuntu ethos, the dignity of persons is inherent, that is, the inestimable

worth of persons exists as an inborn human characteristic. To lovingly relate with another person is to relate with them in a manner that honors their human worth.

Due to the reason that we have a dignity, relationships with others demand one to be compassionate and hospitable in society. “(U)buntu as a moral theory encourages the ethic of responsibility and obligation towards others” (Koenane and Olatunji 2017, 275). A person with ubuntu is motivated to act morally by his or her sincere love for others. By emphasizing hospitality towards others, i.e., an unfeigned friendliness that is contrary to a conceited neighborliness, the ubuntu ethic pays special attention to individuals facing some predicament. The concern for accomplishing concrete associations with others, persons with a dignity, demands a reciprocal response. Hence, genuine communal associations that are prescribed by an ubuntu ethos are reciprocal in nature.

6. Interpreting ubuntu

First, we, all people, are beings with a dignity. I use the term “dignity” to refer to an incalculable worth of persons. Humans have a worth that surpasses all other creatures. Consider a farm owner who is critically confronted with a shortage of fresh water for his thirsty horses, but also dehydrated workers. Further, consider that all the farm workers are so poor that none of them has money comparable to the price of a single horse. Should the farm owner give water first to horses and then the remainder, if there is any, to the farm workers? As per the ubuntu ethos, the farm owner ought to supply water first to employees and then to the animals only when people have gotten enough to drink. Our dignity deserves sincere honoring.

The idea of dignity is connected to the view that humans have rights. Across the world states and organizations such United Nations highlight that every human person has rights. For example, the constitution of South Africa points out that everyone has an innate dignity and a right to be honored (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, 6). All individuals have rights due to the reason that people are beings that have a dignity.

Secondly, I briefly consider what gives people a dignity. Thaddeus Metz, a distinguished scholar rightly emphasizes the perspective that

persons' inherent capacity for friendly relationships is what bestows a moral status on humans (2022, 172). While there are domesticated animals that on the face of it engage with humans, such as cats, people have a unique capacity to engage in loving relationships, understood as dignity. Hence, according to my interpretation of ubuntu, having a "dignity" means that persons have an intrinsic quality that enables them to relate with others in the community in ways different and higher than animals, such as apes (Metz 2022, 348). A person with dignity is one who has the capacity to lovingly relate with others.

Note that striving to respectfully relate with others is key to being recognizable as a person in a typical African society. Mojalefa L.J. Koenane and Cyril-Mary Pius Olatunji, who are also noteworthy scholars, assert the perspective that an individual can be said to be a person due to the reason that "one's actions are accepted by the community as good; on the other hand, we refer to other people as 'non-persons' because they exhibit conduct that does not fit in with what is regarded as ubuntu" (2017, 267). Respecting dignity involves demonstrating an upright moral behavior in relations with others in the community. I remind the reader that the immeasurable worth of humans is inborn and shared by all persons.

Plausibly, it is hard to conceive the worth of a psychopath who has no respect towards the lives of others. The relational view considers the idea that extreme psychopaths, i.e., exceptionally brutal, violent, deformed, and life-threatening individuals, "lack a dignity equal to ours" (Metz 2022, 250). Notice that the psychopathic human's worth remains higher than that of other creatures, say, animals like horses. "We do much more for the [...] psychopathic, and incapacitated than we do animals, which is evidence of a greater ability to make them an object of a friendly relationship" (Metz 2022, 250). In contrast to animals, persons are able to incorporate the extreme psychopathic and incapacitated humans, "in a 'we', cooperate with them, act in ways likely to improve their quality of life, exhibit sympathetic emotions with them, and act for their sake" (Metz 2022, 250). Persons with ubuntu are loving towards all others in society because of their dignity.

Thirdly, it is vital not only to consider what makes persons more precious than any other creature across the entire universe, but also to discuss how we ought to treat people with dignity. A being with dignity, that

is to say, a person who has the capacity to achieve loving relationships with others (Metz 2022), merits respect. Respecting the worth of others involves sincere friendly engagements with them. To behave in the right manner towards beings with worth is to demonstrate an unfeigned friendly attitude towards others. I submit that if a relationship is unfeignedly friendly, it is necessarily respectful. A person with ubuntu is an individual who lives respectfully with others. "(I)n looking at Ubuntu (personhood or humanness, and/ or respect for human dignity) as an aspect of African hospitality, one realises that the postcolonial Africa cannot fail to uphold human dignity" (Gathogo 2008, 40). It is critical to achieve respectful relationships with all individuals in society.

Moreover, this ubuntu ethic illustrates each person's moral task of becoming an ideal individual, an upright person in society. Thus, the concept of ubuntu comprehended as a sincere friendliness towards others "enriches African philosophy by the clear and concise way in which it expresses the thinking of the ideal African person" (Gathogo 2008, 44). Moral philosophy includes laying bare what is involved in the undertaking of achieving morality. Why should a person be moral? Who is a morally upright individual? My response to the above questions is grounded on idea that we all merit loving relationships. I find compelling the point of view that "(h)umanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create each other and need to sustain this otherness creation" (Eze 2010, 190-191). Plausibly, it is critical to encourage acts that lead to loving relationships among people in the community. Therefore, becoming an ideal person involves exhibiting sincere respect for the dignity of others in society. One's capacity to relate lovingly with others ought to be promoted. Each person's role in every individual's endeavor to become moral should not be diminished, but should be encouraged.

Furthermore, ubuntu prescribes hospitality towards others. In a typical African society, it is important to exhibit hospitality towards others (Gathogo 2008, 40; Nzimakwe 2014, 31; Koenane 2018, 5; Cohen 2019, 47; Metz 2019, 140; 2022, 356). What does hospitality mean? "Hospitality" denotes welcoming another person as a potential friend (Magezi and Khlopa 2021, 18). A person with ubuntu understands that every human is an important being in the community. Observe that even individuals who are considered to be rivals deserve hospitality. Gathogo affirms the view that hospitality is not limited to a particular type of people but "is

ideally extended to all people: friends, foes and/or strangers” (2008, 40). It is through welcoming others sincerely that the right sort of relationships can be found.

Additionally, to have ubuntu/hunhu is to be able to connect with the experiences of others in the community. When people lovingly relate with each other in the community, an individual thinks “of oneself as a ‘we’ with another person, participating in joint activities with her, going out of one’s way to help her, and doing so on the basis of compassion and for her sake” (Metz 2011b, 236). Hence, one’s connection with other members of society leads to exhibition of solidarity and identity in relationships. One who is able to identify with others is a person who “participates in cooperative endeavours for reasons beyond mere prudence” (Metz 2022, 149). For example, membership in a hunting club demonstrates a person who is identifying himself or herself with fellow hunters. A person who expresses solidarity is one who “acts to improve another’s condition” (Metz 2022, 151), which means meeting their needs and more generally improving their quality of life. To achieve friendly relationships with others requires revealing both identity and solidarity. Hence, an ubuntu ethic specifies how people in society can achieve unfeigned associations with each other.

7. Reasons why my interpretation of ubuntu is attractive

First, my analysis of the ubuntu ethos is attractive because it captures much about African values such as love, hospitality, and sincere concern towards others in the community. According to the ubuntu ethic, one ought to be respectful towards other persons. Most African values are rooted in the understanding that one needs others to fully flourish. Several scholars affirm that African moral values discourage different forms of bad behaviour (Idang 2015, 103; Koenane 2018, 5; Mbembe 2017; 2019; Gathogo 2023). “Bad behavior” entails unloving acts towards others in society. One ought to avoid colonial influences that do not promote the dignity of all. Further, the African ethic encourages all members of society to discharge their communal duties in ways that display an authentic love towards others. Hence, to demonstrate an authentic love towards others is not only to act morally, but to affirm the dignity of persons in society.

Secondly, my interpretation of ubuntu is appealing as an ethic, that is, it gives us right answers about how one ought to act to achieve enduring practical loving relationships with others in society. A person who is motivated by the ubuntu ethic understands that to be unloving towards others is to constrain the prospects of achieving practical relationships with others. Contrary to an unloving individual, a person who is prompted by the ubuntu ethic exhibits identity and solidarity. Positive associations with others involve “prizing identity and solidarity or, more carefully, the capacity of individuals to relate in those ways.” (Metz 2022, 355-356). Hence, loving relationships with others in the community demand that one should be respectful towards all people.

8. Challenges to interpreting ubuntu

Now that I have explained the ubuntu ethic, I present two challenges that confront my interpretation of ubuntu, but also show how I overcome the issues. First, regarding ubuntu as an ethic that prescribes that one should primarily be concerned with his or her family, including relatives and political companions has “dangers in that the criterion in determining who is ‘our person’ and ‘who is not one of us’ is indeed a tricky one” (Gathogo 2008, 47). Every individual has a dignity that deserves fitting unfeigned honor.

Above I illustrated that identity and solidarity should not merely be exhibited to family members or kinsmen, but to every person in society. My interpretation of ubuntu stresses the perspective that loving relationships that are prescribed by relational ethos, i.e., ubuntu ethic, are not conditioned by kingdom or blood-relatedness (Metz 2022, 184), or affluence. Hence, I defend the standpoint that partiality towards others in the community does not reveal authentic commitment to loving relationships with others.

However, I do not totally reject a principle such as family first or that love ought to begin at one’s home, for example towards a mother or brother. Rather, there are particular circumstances that demand one to favour her family before strangers. In contrast to strangers, blood relatives, workmates, and one’s compatriots “are the sorts of persons who straightforwardly merit extra cooperation and help from a given agent,

because of the relationship that agent has shared with them” (Metz 2022, 312). I contend that parents are entitled to take care of their children before they contemplate going to the streets to take charge of strangers, say, street kids.

Secondly, one might challenge the idea that we should have concern for the people facing any form of predicament. Individuals should seek by themselves, from their own friends or relatives, the means to meet life challenges in society. Kindliness is owed to one’s friends who are capable of returning some favours.

Contrary to the above viewpoint, I point out that concern for suffering individuals does not indicate moral weakness, but rather shows a courageous act towards others. Plausibly, when people who are in any form of misery, say the poor who live in the margins of the community, are not treated in a friendly manner, they become strangers or foes that on the face of it deserve disassociation. Instead, my relational ethos proposes an interconnection and outreach that is achieved through welcoming people with hospitality (Metz 2019, 140). Authentic love is practically demonstrated by one’s willingness to relate with others. I share Gabriel E. Idang’s view that African philosophy has a strong concern for morality (Idang 2015, 103). Plausibly, good moral principles, that is to say, an ethic that is firmly grounded in identity and solidarity, enhance people’s capacity to lovingly relate with each other. Hence, it is crucial to highlight that “the concept of Ubuntu obliges every single person and all communities (nation states or other forms of communities) to welcome all strangers” (Graness 2019, 101). Again, I emphasize that hospitality does not weaken society, but strengthens it through practically demonstrating what it means to be friendly towards others. The African ethic, the ubuntu ethos, enables members of society to practically display compassion towards others.

9. Rationale for keeping borders

Across the world, borders have continued to serve as boundaries for different states. Why should states, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe that share national boundaries, keep borders that separate one African country from the other? In this section, I apply the ubuntu ethic

to the problem of borders. I provide a coherent argument for why state borders should continue to exist according to my understanding of the ubuntu ethic. “As an ideal, Ubuntu means the opposite of being self-ish and self-centered. An ubuntu ethos promotes cooperation between individuals, cultures, and nations” (Nzimakwe 2014, 30). The first reason that I give for why state boundaries should remain in place is that respect motivated by the ubuntu ethos involves honouring the other’s limits or confines. Furthermore, I illustrate the idea that borders offer protection to society. Finally, I point out that borders encourage decentralization of power.

10. Respect inspired by ubuntu ethic involves honouring others’ limits/confines

First, to act in a respectful manner that is inspired by the ubuntu ethic involves honouring the others’ limits/confines, i.e., boundaries that are a common feature in the everyday living of people. To have ubuntu is to have respect towards other persons (Gathogo 2008, 40; Gade 2011, 309; Koenane 2018, 4). Consider an individual who chooses to disregard boundaries on fields, homesteads, or markings that separate one African village from the other. Plausibly, choosing to neglect others’ communal boundaries is a form of disrespect that unsettles the achievement of loving relationships in the community. The ubuntu ethic “affirms that the importance we give to each other is what enables us to live together and respect our differences as human beings” (Koenane 2018, 4). We are all beings with an unlimited worth.

I stress the point of view that “ubuntu” means that one exhibits concern, kindness, and friendliness towards relationships with other people (Samkange and Samkange 1980, 39). A person with ubuntu would choose not only to respect smaller boundaries, such as those of others’ fields or homestead as per above example, but also to honour larger borders, for example those of a state. The ubuntu ethic prescribes that a state ought to exist in a friendly manner with neighboring nations (Samkange and Samkange 1980, 50; Gade 2011, 310). Hence, I point out that according to an ubuntu ethos, authentic respect demands that one honours others’ boundaries, including wide boundaries like those of a state.

Moreover, I consider the objection that the above two kinds of cases, smaller home edges and national frontiers, are disanalogous since local confines, such as homestead boundaries, are not only very small, but are insignificant in comparison to large international borders. I stress the idea that although the above two cases consider borders with varying sizes, plausibly one ought to be respectful in the same manner to every kind of boundary. We owe respect to the confines of others. To act in a disrespectful manner towards others' boundaries, whether they are local as those of an individual's farm or are international like the state borders, is to behave against the demands of the ubuntu ethic. The ubuntu ethos stresses the notion that one ought to be respectful towards others. A person who has respect for others is one who strives to honour borders, the limits, or confines of others.

11. *Protection for society*

National borders should be maintained because they guarantee protection of society against misconduct that could be performed by other governments. The well-functioning of a state's economy, social and political entities require supervision, but also defense from the wrongdoing of other governments or organizations. Although almost every modern society is governed by a specific administration, "(m)odern states, even rival ones, acknowledge one another's existence, if only implicitly through their own understanding of their boundaries and jurisdiction" (Morris 1998, 31). A border marks a state's own location, as well as the set of regulations that ought to be treated with respect by other governments.

Friendly cooperation between various governments continues to benefit people throughout the world. However, it is not always certain that other governments will adhere to principles of global justice. In order to protect society, using borders, an administration could decide to establish norms that ban the importation of a particular product, say, a commodity that is associated with some health risks, from another government. Borders enable states not only to separate themselves from others, but also to protect people in their jurisdiction by demanding fairness from other administrations across the world.

12. *Decentralization of power*

State borders, for example the boundaries between South Africa and Zimbabwe, enable decentralization of power. By “decentralization of power” I mean the sharing of authority among various individuals. In loving relationships, according to the ubuntu ethic, what is of paramount importance is not power, but the accomplishment of an unfeigned identity and solidarity. Borders enable the larger community to be reduced to smaller constituents where political leaders, for example lawmakers, are more able to attain identity and solidarity in the community. “Ubuntu as a philosophy can also not be seen as a one size fits all solution in the challenges that the African society faces today” (Nzimakwe 2014, 39). Living together in friendly relationships that honor each person’s dignity, i.e., associations that have an authentic identity and solidarity (Metz 2022, 145-156), requires that decision making is not limited to one or only a few leaders, but that it is unrestricted to all people who are capable of executing leadership duties.

Observe that the sharing of political duties in the community is a measure that deters the emergence of a dictatorship, a political structure that contradicts the ubuntu ethos. “(I)f political and economic institutions ought to be designed to improve people’s lives, then it is natural to structure them in ways likely to foster ubuntu, a plausible understanding of how best to live” (Metz 2021, 4). It is important to have a political structure that prevents one individual or a few from having unchecked power over the controlling of a number of states or societies. Hence, the decentralization of power that is caused by borders helps communities *prima facie* to be guided by the norms of an ubuntu ethic to establish controls that limit the emergence of a dictatorship.

13. *Concrete changes to borders*

In this section, I discuss what welcoming one’s neighbor entails for the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, the primary example in this philosophical essay. It is crucial to point out that social and political association is not permanent but “is constantly negotiated” (Mbembe 2017). I consider state boundaries from a relational ethos, i.e., an ubun-

tu/hunhu ethic understanding. It is essential to emphasize that ubuntu does not only involve welcoming one's neighbor, but includes practical concern for others. To have the moral characteristic of hunhu is to have humanness, but also to reveal virtues that make one accomplish the honouring of communal or friendly relationships with others in society (Metz 2021, 4). I advance the proposition that friendly attitudes towards others should be exhibited by concrete acts on the borders. Above, I have already pointed out that I do not propose getting rid of the border entirely. Instead, I debate what criteria should be used to regulate who crosses the state boundary.

14. Multiple ports of entry on border

I do not merely consider challenges that the poor migrants face on the border, but I also lay bare the dangers involved in limiting ports of entry. Again, note that the South Africa – Zimbabwe border, which is one of the busiest in Africa, regularly experiences bottlenecks, that is, congestion of vehicles (Ngarachu *et al.*, 2019, 6-11). Consider an accident at the border involving a truck carrying mining explosives or fuels. It is essential to establish measures that encourage the safeguarding of the dignity of persons at the South Africa – Zimbabwe border. Plausibly, the creation of multiple ports of entry on borders is an important safety measure. Notice that an ubuntu moral ethic “is much more than what people do; it is also about the failure to act appropriately when obligated to do so” (Koenane and Olatunji 2017, 268). An ubuntu moral theory prescribes an obligation to honour the dignity of persons, including the life of each individual. I argue that multiple entry points would not only make it easier and cheaper for the movement of resources and migrants across states, but also make borders safe for the migrants and the states. A state that is concerned about people's safety, everywhere in the country including the border, is a government that honours people's dignity.

I consider the view that borders should exist without any alterations, such as the creation of multiple port of entries, since establishing new ports is costly. Different communities should maintain their manner of living without considering problems originating from another society. Rather than establishing modifications on the border, it is plausible to

assist the poor in their own state without allowing them to cross the border.

In response to the above objection, multiple ports of entry would ensure that individuals crossing the border are afforded protection and dignity that is fitting to humans. Although the construction of new ports is costly, protection of human life should not be avoided because of the absence of financial gains. Moral acts involve actions that increase the protection of life, hospitability, and respect towards the dignity of persons. Since in a typical African society an ideal person is hospitable to all people (Gathogo 2008, 40), one should not prevent the community from being welcoming towards others. The creation of multiple port of entries on the South Africa - Zimbabwe border, a boundary with only one lawful port of entry that is used by all vehicles including heavy industrial trucks and passenger vehicles, is an endeavour that not only increases the protection of life, but also establishes a more dignified way of crossing the border.

15. Adjusting border restrictions

Permission to stay in the host nation should not be limited only to individuals who possess educational or job-related credentials. Wilfred Lajul points out that controls for human movement across borders “not only increase the vulnerability of migrants, they also complicate migration policies and increase security threats by making flows invisible” (2020, 168). It is essential to keep impoverished migrants from being vulnerable. I argue that even though one’s credentials are important for proving one’s ability to make contributions towards the economy of the host state, educational qualifications do not show beyond reasonable doubt people’s capacity to prize friendly relations with others. The dignity, i.e., the capacity to engage in respectful relations, of people is an essential characteristic of human beings (Metz 2022). Albeit lacking affluence, the poor migrants have a capacity to engage in respectful associations, a human quality that enables them to contribute towards the success of society. Plausibly, friendly relations are the foundation of the community, since genuine success of society depends on how individuals relate with each other in society. Relating with others in a “friendly manner is more

or less to enjoy a sense of togetherness, to engage in cooperative projects, to help one another, and to do so for reasons beyond self-interest” (Metz 2020, 260). Therefore, it is important to eliminate regulations that prioritize the requirement of credentials on the border since such norms exclude people’s capacity to honor friendly relations in society.

Further, rather than demanding credentials, I submit that host nations can use good conduct certificates to measure individuals’ viciousness and misbehavior. In a typical African society, behavior is one of the essential “attributes of stranger-host social interaction” (Shack 1979, 42). Achieving respectful relationships with others demands good behavior. Plausibly, good conduct certificates issued by relevant authorities in the sending and receiving countries are sufficient indicators of one’s character at a given time. “The Ubuntu character needs to pre-dominate the approach towards treatment of immigrants and refugees in Africa” (Sebola 2019, 6). Each person has the duty to achieve good behavior. Since it is critical for a person not to shun his or her duty of accomplishing ubuntu, I argue that one who fails to get a good conduct certificate should first improve his or her character before he or she is authorized to cross the border.

A good conduct certificate would differ from the current requirement of a police certificate in that the prior primarily aims to affirm a person’s good character while the latter would be generally issued if one does not have a crime. In contrast to a police certificate, a good conduct certificate would include exceptional moral acts that one has accomplished. For example, a good conduct certificate could highlight one’s voluntary acts of helping the elderly in society.

One might object that scraping border restrictions such as the requirement of credentials would disrupt the poor migrants’ endeavor to achieve ubuntu. The removal of educational requirements might be understood as something that makes poor migrants indifferent to striving towards high economic or political success in the host state. Hence, in this second objection, achieving ubuntu is associated with working hard, an achievement that is indicated by one’s credentials.

Credentials do not make it totally probable that one would be industrious in the host state. One could be willing to work hard even without an education. According to an ubuntu ethos, it is not the acquisition of an education that makes one a moral person, but the willingness to

work hard. Although those with skills could do better for others with their labour, reliable contribution towards the success of the community requires working hard.

16. Poor migrants no worse than skilled or rich migrants at fostering relationality

Lastly, observe that poor migrants are no worse than skilled or rich migrants at fostering relationality. First, border regulations that do not exclude, but also involve, the poor make community relationships wealthier. Michael Eze, in his worth noting research on the problem of violence towards migrants, i.e., “I Am Because You Are: Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Xenophobia”, affirms that all persons, including individuals considered to be strangers, have the capacity to enrich one’s humanity (2017, 101). Although the poor migrants do not possess a considerable amount of financial resources, their capacity for loving relationships is worth considering. It is through associating with others that one attains humanity (Gathogo 2008, 46; Gade 2011, 313-314; Graness 2019, 98). The ubuntu ethic emphasizes the importance of achieving sincere communal relations, friendly associations that include all people, such as the skilled, rich, and poor. The accomplishment of genuine relationships with one another in society leads to an exchange of skills, wisdom, and political ideas.

17. Ubuntu and borders in different continents

The above proposals to make changes to the South Africa - Zimbabwe border, my main example in this study, stem from the contemplation of how the current worldwide problems of migration, particularly the movement of the poor on the border, could be morally resolved. The ubuntu ethic could help scholars and states to envision new concrete ways of dealing with the movement of poor migrants. Ubuntu is an ethic that contemplates not only conflict of interest, but also ways of promoting the dignity of all persons, even in relationships that do not bring about profits/financial gains. Hence, although the proposals that I make in this essay are particularly for the Southern Africa, viz., the South Africa - Zimbabwe border, the suggestions could be applied to other international

boundaries, in Africa or the world, that are problematic to states and poor migrants.

Furthermore, it is critical for states to establish policies that not only secure the borders, but also protect the dignity of poor migrants. Many different people continue to choose to migrate to richer nations. Depending on each country's capacity to engage with migrants, governments ought to establish border regulations that do not disfavour the poor migrants. I remind the reader that dignity entails the capacity to relate lovingly with others (Metz 2022, 167-170). Above, I have demonstrated that the lack of things like educational certificates and financial proof do not take away people's capacity to relate lovingly with others. Ubuntu promotes not only the worth of all persons, but also the establishment of loving relationships in the state.

Lastly, the exportation of the ubuntu ethos to other continents requires new ways of encouraging policy makers to engage with scholars who are familiar with the literature on the ubuntu ethic. Additionally, I emphasize the idea that the exportation of ubuntu ethic involves encouraging the impoverished migrants to practically exhibit their capacity is to relate lovingly with others in the host nation.

Conclusion

Substantial migration of the poor is a problem that involves the debate of whether state borders should be abolished and, if not, how they should be regulated. Using the South Africa - Zimbabwe border as my main example, in this essay I argued for an application of an ubuntu ethos to the issue of borders, making some concrete prescriptions for change in policy.

Grounded on the ubuntu ethic, I contended with the challenge of borders in relation to poor migrants. I highlighted that hunhuism, as a philosophy of how to exist together informed by hunhu, that is to say, humanness of a person, captures the basis of being among the Shona speaking people (Samkange and Samkange 1980; Mungwini 2017, 143). Additionally, I stressed that ubuntu prescribes love, understood as an unfeigned expression of identity and solidarity (Metz 2022) towards others in society.

Plausibly, an ubuntu ethos is concerned with removing barriers that limit the success of loving relationships with others in the community. Ubuntu involves exhibiting upright moral actions in relation to others in society, but also “exhibiting solidarity with or caring for others, i.e., doing what is expected to advance people’s good and doing so for their sake” (Metz 2022, 201). Achieving friendly relationships in the community requires overcoming indifference towards alienated individuals.

After articulating the ubuntu ethic in the third segment of the study, I applied the African philosophy to challenges of the border in the fourth and fifth sections of the essay. By reason of the ubuntu ethic, I drew the conclusion that while colonial boundaries in African states, for example the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa, should remain for advantages such as protection and decentralized authority, it is imperative to get rid of the regulations that disfavor the poor migrants. I indicated that loving persons establish a society that is openly accessible by all individuals including impoverished immigrants.

African state boundaries should continue to exist, but it is essential to construct multiple port of entries on the national borders. Laws that discredit the poor migrants’ worth should be changed. All individuals, including the poor migrants, should be able to cross the border. Ubuntu is one of the “aspects of African hospitality that clearly embodies the positive thinking of the Africans” (Gathogo 2008, 44). Notwithstanding the fact that the practical resolutions I suggested for change on borders are particularly focused on my chief example, i.e., South Africa - Zimbabwe border, the proposals can likewise be applied to a comparable border challenge on the basis of the ubuntu ethic.

Acknowledgments

Firstly, I would like to thank the organizers and the participants at “Territorial Rights and Rights to Movement and Subsistence” conference in Genova, Italy. Secondly, I am sincerely grateful to the anonymous referees who big-heartedly provided guidance on how to improve this essay. The referees’ suggestions taught me so much. Thank you so much! Lastly, I would like to thank Prof Thaddeus Metz, my unmatched mentor. Thank you so much for teaching me Philosophy, Prof Metz. The research was undertaken as part of the doctoral programme in Philosophy at the University of Pretoria.

References

- Ani E.I. (2021), “Open Borders and Brain Drain: A Moral Dimension”, *Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 168-185.
- Brock G., Hassoun N. (2023), “Global Justice”, in E.N. Zalta and U. Nodelman (eds), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-global/#:~:text=Global%20justice%20inquiries%20take%20individual,fairness%20among%20such%20agents%20involves>.
- Broodryk J. (2006), *Ubuntu: Life Coping Skills from Africa*, Johannesburg, Knowres.
- Carens J. (1987), “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders”, *Review of Politics*, vol. 49, n. 2, pp. 251-273.
- (2013), *The Ethics of Immigration*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Chekero T., Morreira S. (2020), “Mutualism Despite Ostensible Difference: HuShamwari, Kuhanyisana, and Conviviality Between Shona Zimbabweans and Tsonga South Africans in Giyani, South Africa”, *Africa Spectrum*, vol. 55, n. 1, pp. 33-49.
- Cobbing J. (1988), “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolombo”, *Journal of African History*, vol. 29, n. 3, pp. 487-519.
- Cohen R. (2019), “Strangers and Migrants in the Making of African Societies: A Conceptual and Historical Review”, *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 12, n. 1, pp. 45-59.
- Crush J., Tevera, D. (2010), “Exiting Zimbabwe”, in J. Crush, D. Tevera (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*, Cape Town, South African Migration Programme, pp. 1-51.
- Curtis B. (2009), “The Chirundu Border Post: Detailed Monitoring of Transit Times’ *Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program*”, Discussion Paper n. 10. pp. 1-43.

- De Castro D.L., Sy A.P. (2017), "Ethics in Migration and Global Health Delivery: Issues of Justice and Integrity", *Asia Pacific Journal of Health Law & Ethics*, vol. 10, n. 2, pp. 29-50.
- Diplock K. (1946), "Passports and Protection in International Law", *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, vol. 32, pp. 42-59.
- Eldredge E.A. (1992), "Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, C. 1800-30: The 'Mfecane' Reconsidered", *Journal of African History*, vol. 33, n. 1, pp. 1-35.
- Eze M. (2010), *Intellectual History in Contemporary South Africa*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- (2017), "I Am Because You Are: Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Xenophobia", *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 46, n. 1, pp. 85-109.
- Fourie W. (2015), "Four Concepts of Africa", *HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies*, vol. 71, n. 3, pp. 1-10.
- Gade C.B.N. (2011), "The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu", *South African Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 30, n. 3, pp. 303-329.
- Gathogo J. (2008), "African Philosophy as Expressed in the Concepts of Hospitality and Ubuntu", *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*, vol. 130, p. 39-53.
- (2023), "Nexus Between Refugee Crisis in the Eastern, African Region and Ubuntu Concept" [International Symposium on Ubuntu and Migration]. *University of Pretoria Philosophy Seminar Series*, Pretoria, South Africa.
- Graness A. (2019), "Ubuntu and the Politics of Migration", in J. Ogude, U.Dyer (eds), *Ubuntu and the Everyday in Africa*, Trenton, Africa World Press, pp. 89-112.
- Gulddal J., Payne C. (2017), "Passports: On the Politics and Cultural Impact of Modern Movement Control", *Symploke*, vol. 25, n. 1-2, pp. 9-23.
- Hamilton C.A. (1992), "The Character and Objects of Chaka": A Reconsideration of the Making of Shaka as 'Mfecane' Motor", *Journal of African History*, vol. 33, pp. 37-63.
- Idang G.E. (2015), "African Culture and Values", *Phronimon*, vol. 16, n. 2, pp. 97-111.
- Koenane M.L.J. (2018), "Ubuntu and Philoxenia: Ubuntu and Christian World-views as Responses to Xenophobia", *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*, vol. 74, n. 1, pp. 1-8.
- Koenane M.L.J., Olatunji, C.P. (2017), "Is it the End or Just the Beginning of Ubuntu? Response to Matolino and Kwindigwi in View of Metz's Rebuttal", *South African Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 36, n. 2, pp. 263-277.
- Lajul W. (2020), "Africa in the Politics, Ethics and Justice System of an Open Borders World", *Arts and Humanities Open Access Journal*, vol. 4, n. 5, pp. 166-174.
- MacKenzie M.J. (2005), *The Partition of Africa 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, New York, Taylor and Francis e-Library.

- Magezi V., Khlopa C. (2021), "The Tenet of *Ubuntu* in South (African) Ethics: Inclusive Hospitality and Christian Ethical Disposition of Effective Pastoral Care in Africa", *Stellenbosch Theological Journal*, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 1-32.
- Manyanga M., Chirikure S. (2019), "The Mapungubwe–Great Zimbabwe Relationship in History: Implications for the Evolution of Studies of Socio-Political Complexity in Southern Africa", *South African Archaeological Society*, vol. 12, pp. 72-84.
- Mbembe A. (2017), "Africa Needs Free Movement", *Mail & Guardian*, <https://mg.co.za/article>.
- (2019), "No African Is a Foreigner in Africa – Except Down in South Africa", *Mail & Guardian*, <https://mg.co.za/article>.
- Metz T. (2007), "Toward an African Moral Theory", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 15, n. 3, pp. 321-341.
- (2011a), "Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa", *African Human Rights Law Journal*, vol. 11, n. 2, pp. 532-559.
- (2011b), "An African Theory of Dignity and Relational Conception of Poverty", in John W. De Gruchy (ed.), *The Humanist Imperative in South Africa*, Stellenbosch, SUN Press, pp. 233-241.
- (2019), "Relational African Values between Nations: Bringing Communion to the Global Order", in F. Onditi, G. Ben-Nun, C. D'Alessandro, Z. Levey (eds), *Contemporary Africa and the Foreseeable World Order*, Lanham, Lexington Books, pp. 133-150.
- (2020), "Humility and the African Philosophy of *Ubuntu*", in M. Alfano, M.P. Lynch, A. Tanesini, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility*, London, Routledge, pp. 257-267.
- (2021), "Ubuntu: The Good Life", in F. Maggino (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*, <https://philarchive.org/archive>, pp. 1-5.
- (2022), *A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Mongia R.V. (1999), "Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport", *Public Culture*, vol. 11, n. 3, pp. 527-556.
- Morris C.W. (1998), *An Essay on the Modern State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Moyo I. (2020), "On Decolonising Borders and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region", *Social Sciences*, vol. 9, n. 32, pp. 1-12.
- Mulindwa P. (2020), "Interstate Border Conflicts and their Effects on Region-Building and Integration of the East African Community", *African Journal of Governance and Development*, vol. 9, n. 2, pp. 599-618.

- Mungwini P. (2017), *Indigenous Shona Philosophy: Reconstructive Insights*, Grahamstown, African Humanities Program.
- Murenje M. (2020), "Ubuntu and Xenophobia in South Africa's International Migration", *African Journal of Social Work*, vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 95-98.
- Musoni F. (2012), "With an Apron in the Caboose: Illegal Migration Across the Zimbabwe - South Africa Border", Ph.D. Thesis, Emory University.
- Ndlovu T. (2012), "Escaping Home: The Case of Ethnicity and Formal Education in the Migration of Zimbabweans During the Zimbabwean 'Crisis'", in S. Chiumbu, M. Musemwa (eds), *Crisis! What Crisis? The Multiple Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis*, Pretoria, HSRC Press, pp. 100-121.
- Ngarachu A., Wood C., Krogman H., Tshuma E., Mudenda D. (2019), "Bottlenecks or Growth Zones? A Study of the Chirundu and Beitbridge Border Economies", *Southern African Journal of Policy and Development*, vol. 4, n. 2, pp. 6-14.
- Nkrumah K. (1969), *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution*, New York, International Publishers.
- Nwachukwu J.N., Ogundiwin A.O. (2020), "The Second Scramble for Africa: A Cause for Afro-Pessimism", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science*, vol. 11, n. 1, pp. 50-64.
- Nzimakwe T.I. (2014), "Practising Ubuntu and Leadership for Good Governance: The South African and Continental Dialogue", *African Journal of Public Affairs*, vol. 7, n. 4, pp. 30-41.
- Obbo C. (1979), "Village Strangers in Buganda Society", in W.A. Shack, E.P. Skinner (eds), *Strangers in African Societies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 227-242.
- Oduntan G. (2015), *International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa*, New York, Routledge.
- Okeja U. (2021), "Migration, Agency and Global Justice", Seminar Presentation, June, *Virtual Wits Philosophy Research Seminar*, Johannesburg.
- Prozesky M. (2016), "Ethical Leadership Resources in Southern Africa's Sesotho-Speaking Culture and in King Moshoeshoe I", *Journal of Global Ethics*, vol. 12, n. 1, pp. 6-16.
- Ramose M.B. (1999), *African Philosophy Through Ubuntu*, Harare, Mond.
- (2002), "The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy", in P.H. Coetzee, A.P.J. Roux (eds), *Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 230-237.
- (2021), "Ubu-Ntu Ethics in Dialogue with Kant's Deontic Ethics", *Estudos Kantianos*, vol. 9, n. 2, pp. 33-52.
- Robertson C. (2010), *The Passport in America: The History of a Document*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Rukema J.R., Popphiwa N. (2020), "Cross-Border Mobility Between South Africa and Zimbabwe: Historical and Contemporary Trajectories of Development in Musina, South Africa", *Mankind Quarterly*, vol. 61, n. 2, pp. 273-292.
- Samkange S., Samkange T.M. (1980), *Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy*, Harare, Graham.
- Sanni J.S. (2020), "Decolonising Borders: Re-imagining Strangeness and Spaces", *Theoria*, vol. 67, n. 2, pp. 1-24.
- Sebola M.P. (2019), "Refugees and Immigrants in Africa: Where Is an African Ubuntu?", *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 1-7.
- Shack W.A. (1979), "Introduction", in W.A. Shack, E.P. Skinner (eds), *Strangers in African Societies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 1-20.
- Shutte A. (2001), *Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa*, Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications.
- Republic of South Africa Government (1996), "Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996", <https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf>.
- Wilson M. (1979), "Strangers in Africa: Reflections on Nyakyusa, Nguni, and Sotho Evidence", in W.A. Shack, E.P. Skinner (eds), *Strangers in African Societies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 51-66.
- Wellman C.H., Cole P. (2011), *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

