Abstracts

Enrico Biale

Inclusione politica e libera circolazione. Per un concetto complesso di eguaglianza democratica

An inclusivist reading of democratic polity seems to require both open borders and full political inclusion of those migrants who want to join the political community. Yet more porous borders are compatible, and might encourage, forms of hyper-migration. Since hypermigrants cannot have the sense of attachment toward their hosting society that, according to this inclusivist reading, is required to properly exercise political agency they are excluded from the political arena. While I agree that hypermigrants cannot be fully included in the decision-making because they do not meet the requirements to properly exercise political rights, excluding them is problematic because it justifies a hierarchical society in which hypermigrants are considered less than equal and have no control over decisions that deeply influence their life plans. To overcome these problems I will claim that it is possible to justify an account of differentiated political inclusion according to which full political rights are acknowledged to permanent members only (both natives and migrants) while hypermigrants are partially included. This perspective recognises every member of the polity as a political agent and ensures that she has control over the relevant political decisions without undermining the idea that citizenship requires a sense of belonging to the political community and concern for its long-term interests.

Biblioteca della libertà, LI, 2016
settembre-dicembre, n. 217 • ISSN 2035-5866 77
Nuova serie [www.centroeinaudi.it]

Francesco Chiesa
Political Responsibility for Implicit Bias
In this article I present and discuss the social phenomenon which falls under the rubric of 'implicit bias' and highlight why it is relevant to moral and political theorizing. By implicit bias I refer to those cases in which a stereotype about a certain group is automatically associated to members belonging to that group and affects one's outward behaviour in a way that typically happens below the level of full consciousness and beneath our introspective radar. Implicit bias can be expressed into actual outward behaviours even if and when one is a genuine egalitarian. It is known that such biases tend to be learned from the social structures in which we live and track, to some extent, existing cultural stereotypes and social tendencies, existing patterns of privilege and disadvantage. Is the notion of moral responsibility able to make normative sense of the disadvantage created by implicit bias, that is, by the behavioural manifestations of implicit bias? Or does implicit bias fall beyond the realm of (in)justice? I argue that the agent who discriminates due to implicit bias cannot be considered morally responsible (in the attributability sense and in some versions of the accountability sense), but that he can and should be considered indirectly responsible qua member of the political community and that such responsibility is directly held by political institutions. This is a forward-looking account of responsibility which aims to change those social standards, social norms and stereotypes which create and nourish implicitly biased discriminatory behaviours. This implies a reassessment of the knowledge condition according to which, in the case of non-idiosyncratic implicit biases, the knowledge relevant to moral responsibility need not be 'in the head' of the agent whose actions is under scrutiny, but it has to be knowledge available in the agent's epistemic environment over which institutions have responsibility.

Dario Malinconico
Defining Political Power: Justification, Structure and Genealogy
The essay suggests a redefinition of the opposition between realism and normativism in political philosophy. I start from Norberto Bobbio's classification of different kinds of political philosophy. Bobbio recognizes the distinction between realist and

idealist – what I call normative – theories. But he argues that there is an underlying distinction between rationalist and historicist theories. For Bobbio rationalist theories pose the question "why is there political power?", while historicist theories ask "what are the origins of political power?". I argue that this underlying distinction is much more general than the one between realism and normativism. Redefining Bobbio's distinction, I describe rationalist theories as theories that use the concept of justification. On this account to justify political power means to provide conditions of acceptability for all those involved. In this sense, putting their methodological differences aside, both realist and normative theories are justification theories. On the contrary, historicist theories are based on the historicization of political power. Historicization means "thinking" the political power in its intrinsic historical contingency. In this sense it is more accurate to interpret theories like those of Marx and Foucault using the concept of historicization than putting them aside as realist ones.

Abstracts