

*Rainer Bauböck*

**Specifying the three inclusion principles: A reply to Biale, Ottonelli and Pellegrino**

This response to critics further explains and elaborates the scope of three principles of democratic inclusion: the inclusion of affected interests, of all subjected to coercion, and of all those who have a stake in being recognized as members of a particular self-governing polity. It also defends the claim that a theory of democratic inclusion requires certain background presuppositions. In response to Gianfranco Pellegrino's critique I present conceptual, empirical and normative reasons why a theory of democratic self-government presupposes a background of relatively stable territorial borders towards other polities and an internal diversity of interests, identities and ideas about the common good. Enrico Biale's objections nudge me towards further specifying the 'all affected interests' principle by clarifying that its implications vary according to the impact a policy decision has on external interests. I suggest three graded implications: affected interests must be taken into consideration, must have opportunities of contestation, or must be represented when a policy is deliberated and decided. Transborder referendums are an instance of representation of externally affected interests. The ad hoc *demos* created in such referendums creates an external veto power that need not subvert the integrity of a polity's self-government. I consider Biale's conception of a 'fluid' *demos* as grounded in a combination of the 'all subjected' and the 'all citizenship stakeholder' principles. While this combination works in the specific context of migration between independent states, I have doubts that

it can be applied to other problems and types of polities. Valeria Ottonelli proposes a principle of the identity of rulers and ruled that I question with regard to its implications for representative democracy, and for those citizens who are incapable or unwilling to participate in ruling. I also engage with her version of a 'proximity principle', which in my view can justify the requirement to have common democratic institutions but not the boundaries between democratic polities. Finally, I respond to Ottonelli's challenge that the 'citizenship stakeholder' principle misidentifies the wrong of colonialism as denial of self-government and has exclusionary implications for marginalized groups who do not have a stake in the common good. I conclude by suggesting a 'multilevel polity' test for democratic inclusion principles that requires that they can specify membership rules not only for independent states but also for territorial polities below and above the state.

*Enrico Biale*

**Democratic boundary: A complex account**

In a world characterized by migratory fluxes and where political decisions are deeply interconnected a fine-grained analysis of the boundary of the *demos* and the requirements of citizenship is necessary to grant that political institutions embody democratic values. Rainer Bauböck dedicated his work to properly addressing these problems by defining the boundary of democracy and the requirements of citizenship and addressing these issues from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. Democratic Inclusion is fundamental in this debate because Bauböck further attunes his account, providing one of the most complex and complete versions of democratic *demos* in the literature. Bauböck in fact claims that a proper account of *demos* cannot be grounded on a single principle (all-affected, all-subjected, or stakeholder) but on a plurality of criteria according to which every interest affected should be seriously taken into consideration during the deliberative process, all those who are subjected to coercion should be impartially treated by the authority that exercises this coercion, and those who have a stake in the flourishing of the political community should be granted equal political rights. Though I acknowledge the merits of this pluralistic view of democratic boundaries, I will point out some ambiguities that characterize Bauböck's interpretation of the all-affected principle and I will suggest an account of a fluid *demos*, that is grounded on the all-subjected principle but overcomes the problems Bauböck ascribes to this criterion.

*Francesco Camboni*

**Solidarity: A philosophical concept**

The aim of my article is to outline a survey of the most relevant normative uses of the concept of solidarity, especially in political philosophy and moral theory. Firstly, I will sketch a preliminary overview of the sociological background at the base of the concept of social solidarity, which I think is necessary for both methodological and conceptual reasons. Secondly, I will attempt to describe some of the most widespread philosophical uses of the concept of social solidarity, which I will highlight distinguishing analytically among social, civic, political and moral solidarity. Finally, I will develop a mental experiment which aims to stress a dilemma of loyalty between political solidarity claims and moral solidarity claims.

*Valeria Ottonelli*

**The principle of All Citizens Stakeholders: Who gets excluded?**

In *Democratic Inclusion* Bauböck offers a solution to the *demos* problem, that is the problem of establishing who is entitled to participate in the ruling of the polity through the exercise of democratic political rights. According to Bauböck's solution, the *demos* should include those who have a stake in the polity's autonomy and flourishing. I raise two concerns about Bauböck's argument. The first is that it appears to unduly assume that any solution to the *demos* problem that derives claims to inclusion from subjection to the same government must be arbitrary and indeterminate. The second, more substantive qualm I have with ACS is that it may lead to unduly exclusionary implications. In fact, ACS potentially excludes marginalised and disadvantaged individuals or groups who have strong interconnections with the polity because they have been born and live in its midst, but cannot be said to have a stake in the autonomy and flourishing of the polity exactly because they hold a marginal and disadvantaged position within it.

*Gianfranco Pellegrino*

**The circumstances and context of bounded democracy. Some qualms**

This paper considers Bauböck's view about the connection between democracy and boundaries. Bauböck claims that territorial borders are needed for democracy. The main contention of the paper is that the connection between jurisdictional boundaries, territorial borders and democracy is significantly looser than Bauböck believes. Bauböck's argument rests on two premises.

First, democracy is normatively needed only in conditions of internal and external pluralism. Second, boundaries are needed to guarantee both internal and external pluralism. Against this view, the paper makes two points. First, in historical times many homogeneous polities have been democratic, despite absence of internal diversity. Second, imposing political decisions upon a homogenous citizenry is still undemocratic. As a consequence, boundaries are not necessary conditions for democracy.