

*Rainer Bauböck*

**Democratic inclusion. A pluralistic theory of citizenship**

Whose interests should be represented in democratic decisions? Whose rights ought to be protected by democratic governments? Who has a claim to citizenship and voting rights? Against most current normative theories of democracy, this essay argues that these three questions call for different responses. Democratic legitimacy requires taking into account the interests negatively affected by a decision, providing equal rights and contestation options for all subjected to the law, and granting citizenship status to all citizenship stakeholders whose autonomy and well-being depends on the collective self-government and flourishing of a particular democratic polity. Rainer Bauböck argues that these three responses complement each other but there are also tensions between them that can only be resolved through democratic politics rather than purely theoretical reasoning. The concluding part of the essay applies the principle of including all citizenship stakeholders to a multilevel conception of democracy. Citizenship as membership in local, national and supranational political communities is determined by residence, birthright and derivation respectively. Once again, Bauböck argues for regarding these three rules for determining citizenship as complementing each other, since each one supports a particular purpose of democratic community.

*Antonio Floridia*

**The basis of democracy: Procedural, not moral. Some critical remarks on Habermas**

Given the difficulties faced democracy today, some positions argue for the inadequacy of a purely procedural view of democracy itself. Hence the search

for a stronger foundation of the bases of democracy. This search may take different forms: some provide an epistemic justification of democracy, while others instead support the need to root democracy onto some moral basis. This article critically analyses an essay by Mauro Piras, published in a previous issue of this journal: according to the author, liberal democracy can ultimately be founded only on the idea of the equal moral dignity of individuals. Even the theories (like Habermas's) supporting and striving for an integrally procedural foundation of democracy – Piras claims – turn out to be contradictory, because they still presuppose the equal moral consideration of individuals. The present article challenges this interpretation and analyses some features of Habermas's theoretical projects, which argue against the criticisms addressed to it.

*Federica Liveriero*

**Habermas and Rawls: two models of political legitimacy in dialogue**

In this article I analyze and confront the paradigms of democratic legitimacy envisaged by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. Famously, these two authors had a fruitful thematic exchange in *The Journal of Philosophy* in 1995. I specifically interpret this exchange as a competition over modesty, as both the authors critique the other one for defending a model of legitimacy that is too demanding according to their perspective. I begin my analysis exposing Habermas approach to democratic legitimacy, highlighting the intrinsically procedural account of democracy that Habermas defends. Then, I proceed articulating the main charges that Habermas poses to the Rawlsian model. In the second part of the article I then discuss Rawls' rebutts to Habermas critiques and I cast a light on some clarificatory remarks provided by Rawls that can help in better outlining the justificatory framework that supports his political liberalism project. I conclude the review of this extremely relevant exchange highlighting the similarities between these two models of legitimacy, rather than insisting over the differences