

Kenneth Baynes

Public Reason's Faith

Glen Newey has questioned whether toleration is a relevant political value for a democratic polity or merits the importance assigned to it in Rawls's political theory. After reviewing the relation between religion and the state in some recent interpretations of the First Amendment and their implications, this essay argues that Newey may be correct about the value of toleration in a liberal democratic polity, but if so, it is for very different reasons than those emphasized by him.

Richard Bellamy

Lies, Deception and Democracy

This essay explores how far democracy is compatible with lies and deception, and whether it encourages or discourages their use by politicians. Neo-Kantian arguments, such as Newey's, that lies and deception undermine individual autonomy and the possibility for consent go too far, given that no democratic process can be regarded as a plausible mechanism for achieving collective consent to state policies. However, they can be regarded as incompatible with a more modest account of democracy as a system of public equality among political equals. On this view, the problem with lies and deception derives from their being instruments of manipulation and domination. Both can be distinguished from 'spin', with a working democracy being capable of uncovering them and so incentivising politicians to be truthful. Nevertheless,

while lies and deception will find you out, bullshit and post truth disregard and subvert truth respectively, and as such prove more pernicious as they admit of no standard whereby they might be challenged.

Giulia Bistagnino

Glen Newey and the Concept of the Political

In “Real Legitimation, Anarchism and Power Loops”, Glen Newey proposes a criterion to identify the space of the political. According to him, *what do we do?* is the basic political question which captures what is essential about politics. In this article, I draw on and develop this suggestion by elucidating how different conceptions of politics meet the basic political question. My aim is to show how Newey has pinpointed an innovative and powerful way to understand what are the basic conditions for assessing what falls within the realm of the political.

Detlef von Daniels

Realism, Power-Loops, and Re-Entry. An Imaginary Conversation with Glen Newey over the Gaps of Time and Traditions

In this article I show how Newey’s political realism can be brought into fruitful conversation with continental traditions of philosophy. I criticism of Williams, exampe extinction rebellion, I go on topics fundamental problem also in Luhmann exemplified by reading of Plato. Instead of Antigone I end with a reading of movie the other, darker side, of liberalism.

Dimitrios Eftymiou

Political Lying in Newey and Bellamy

The article provides a qualified defence of Newey’s work on political lying and defends a revamped version of his position from several objections. The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 lays out Newey’s consent-based argument against political lying as well as his views on when political lying is permissible. It provides an analytic and revamped reconstruction of that argument that remains faithful to what it takes to be the key normative kernel of his critique of political lying and it distinguishes between three types of qualifications to its scope. Section 3 shows, contra Bellamy, why Newey’s argument does not constitute “too high a standard” but a rather moderate, if not too timid one by showing that Newey’s core argument i) survives a rejection of a consent-based objection to political lying as a violation of the

agreed terms of democratic association; ii) it is in some respects less realist than Bellamy's preferred approach while more demanding in others; iii) it leaves enough space for civic virtue as a means to robustly safeguarding democratic politics from deception and finally; iv) it provides us with more robust safeguards from political rhetoric and spin than Bellamy's preferred approach creating in that sense the needed space for genuine agreement based on rationality and empirical knowledge consistent with the democratically approved wishes of the electorate.

Greta Favara

Glen Newey's Critique of Legitimacy: An Assessment

In "Real Legitimation, Anarchism and Power Loops" (this issue), Newey examines whether the use of force in political circumstances could be disciplined by drawing clear boundaries between its admissible and inadmissible uses. The question, as Newey recognizes, is about the very possibility of offering a sound theory of legitimacy. Are there any uses of force that we can deem legitimate, and hence acceptable, as opposed to illegitimate ones? According to Newey, a theory of legitimacy can never achieve what it promises: since politics redefines the conditions upon which justifications can be found legitimating, politics constantly interferes with theoretical definitions of the boundaries of legitimacy. Force, as Newey points out, "destroys legitimacy". Yet, Newey's argument works exclusively if we accept that some suitably defined descriptions of politics can ground political normativity. In the specific case considered, if we believe that actual or hypothetical conditions of legitimations have a role in determining the normative criteria for the legitimate use of force. But this is far from obvious.

In this comment, I examine the strength of Newey's general claim on legitimacy by clarifying how the interplay between political reality and political normativity should be interpreted, and what role it is supposed to play, in Newey's analysis. In particular, the paper is structured in two main sections. In the first section I recall in a more detailed way Newey's argument in support of his general conclusion, and I show that, despite its initial ambition, such argument can counter only theories of legitimacy which consider actual or hypothetical legitimations as grounds of legitimacy. However, in the second section, I propose a new argument in support of Newey's general claim. More specifically, I explain that such defense can be built starting from scattered suggestions already contained in Newey's discussion.

Rainer Forst

Toleration, Power and Reason: Continuing a Dialogue with a Political Realist Friend

In this essay, I continue a dialogue with Glen Newey about the normative and political possibility of a conception of toleration that aims at a higher-order justification of its grounds and limits. I argue for such a conception, Glen remained skeptical about it.

Anna Elisabetta Galeotti

Glen Newey's Critique of Political Toleration

In this paper, I would like to rescue political toleration from the corrosive force of Newey's reasoning, while honoring his memory by engaging in a thorough discussion on his challenging views. In the first section of this paper, I shall briefly rehearse Newey's view on toleration both as a moral virtue and as a political issue, focusing especially on the problems that toleration encounters in the political realm of liberal democracy. In the second section, I shall highlight what I take to be the critical aspects of his view, and in the third part of the article, I shall argue for my response to Newey's challenge. More specifically, Newey contends that political toleration is awkward and that its room is just in the interstices of democratic states' action. Though Newey is right in drawing a clear distinction between the circumstances of toleration in social intercourse and in political relations, I argue that, contrary to what he thinks, this difference should lead to different conceptions of toleration, according to whether it applies horizontally or vertically. He moreover contends that political decisions settling issues over toleration of a contested practice are never tolerant, but coercive. No one denies that state decisions are coercive, and yet a clear distinction can be traced between decisions in favor of permitting the contested practice and decisions prohibiting the same very practice. Finally, he claims the accusations of intolerance are circular, and in fact both parties are intolerant. I have rebutted this claim with a conceptual analysis providing clear criteria for setting apart toleration from intolerance and intolerable.

Federica Liveriero

Newey and Rawls in Dialogue: The Limits of Justification and The Conditions of Toleration

In this essay I analyse Glen Newey's reading of John Rawls liberal theory of justice. Newey specifically focuses on strategic differences between A Theory of Justice

and Political Liberalism, and he acutely highlights some tensions that are intrinsic to Rawls's justificatory framework. I share many of Newey's concerns, primarily regarding the necessity to take into account the motivational constraints when outlining a theory of liberal justice. Against Newey, however, in the second section of the paper I clarify some aspect of Rawls's (hidden) epistemology, in order to make sense of the role that the virtue of toleration plays within his paradigm.

Glyn Morgan

Glen Newey's Realism, Liberalism and its Alleged Suppression of Politics

A central claim of political realists is that liberalism suppresses politics. Glen Newey places this claim at the center of his rejection of contemporary political liberalism. For Newey, liberalism suppresses politics in the name of a pre-political conception of morality. This paper defends liberalism from this charge. The modern liberal state allows much more scope for politics than realists like Newey recognize. If politics is suppressed, this is more likely the consequence of political and social institutions rather than morality. Furthermore, the suppression of politics is not always a bad thing.

Michael Mosher

Glen Newey's Brief Against Comprehensive Justification

For Glenn Newey, the abiding temptation of the moral philosopher (which the year 1989 seemed almost to affirm on the political front) was to believe in the idea of a comprehensive moral settlement, a "permanent politico-juridical order" arising with the dawn of a new day. This was for Newey to overplay the only cards that had been dealt. The gamble on finding legitimate moral consensus too frequently turned up the hand of power. *Rogue Theodicy* became for Newey a symbol for overreaching rationality blind to the effects of power in moral argument and blind to the sheer appeal of 'wild freedom'. The debate between Creppell and Newey, between the utopia of 'mutuality' and the realism of 'mortality' now can be taken to illustrate the historical arc of the last 30 years. In a similar post-revolutionary moment gone sour, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1821) exhibited how to combine 'comprehensive justification' with 'wild freedom'.

Enzo Rossi

On Glen Newey's Prescient Political Realism

In this paper I trace some key realist themes in Newey's work, to try and show how his realist insights preceded the explicit realist revival, and how

they then developed in dialogue with the growing realist literature. I then place Newey in a taxonomy of realisms, to the extent that his often illuminatingly contrarian positions allow for such an exercise. Finally, and more speculatively, I consider some of Newey's posthumous work, to try and see where his unique approach to realism might take us next.