


Lorenzo De Sio (Università di Firenze)
Guido Legnante (Università di Pavia)

Governi e opinioni pubbliche dopo le elezioni

Torino, Centro Einaudi e Urge,
Lunedì 15 giugno 2009




Second-order elections

- “Second-order model”: “less at stake” + “national agendas” =>
 - Low electoral participation (and more non valid votes)
 - Good outcome for small&/new parties
 - Losses for governing parties


The 2009 climate

- Economic crisis
- EU: Enough coordination on the economic crisis?
- National factors?




This research: countries and data

- Countries
 - At
 - De
 - Es
 - Fr
 - It
 - NL
 - Pl
 - UK
- Electoral results and survey data
 - Electoral participation
 - Concentration (Neff; Bipolarism)
 - Electoral party results
 - Survey data (Jan 2008 onwards)
 - Party classification
 - **2009 results**




This research: hypotheses and indicators

- Hyp1: in EE participation is lower than in NE
⇒ indicator: electoral participation
- Hyp2: in EE voting concentration is lower than in NE
⇒ indicators: Neff, bipolarism
- Hyp3: in EE anti-European parties are stronger than in NE
⇒ indicators: (through party classification) electoral results
- Hyp4: in EE governing parties are weaker than in NE
⇒ indicators: 2009 electoral results
- Hyp5: since autumn 2008 (economic crisis), governing parties weakened
⇒ indicators: (through party classification) survey data (and past electoral results)
- Hyp6: since autumn 2008 (economic crisis), anti-European parties strengthened
⇒ indicators: (through party classification) survey data (and past electoral results)




Electoral participation [BEFORE]

- In EE electoral participation is lower or much lower than in NE
- Outlier (few differences): Italy
- Apart France (c.a. 2/3 of NE voter vote at EE), around half of NE voters vote in EE




Electoral participation [AFTER]


- In the surveyed countries, participation seems mostly stable;
- Partial exceptions: Italy, France, the Netherlands;




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Germania




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Spagna




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Italia




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Polonia




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Gran Bretagna




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Francia



Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Paesi Bassi




Partecipazione (%voti validi su elettori) - Austria




Electoral fragmentation/concentration [BEFORE]

- Two indicators:
 - Neff
 - Bipolarism index
- NEFF:
 - Apart France, Netherlands and partly UK, there are not huge differences between the effective number of parties in NE and EE
 - Different electoral systems in NE and EE have to taken into consideration, too
- Bipolarism index:
 - France remains the only exception




Electoral fragmentation/concentration [AFTER]


- Hypotheses are mostly confirmed;
- The three original exceptions (fr, nl, uk) present an ***increasingly diverging trend***;
- fr, uk: increase of electoral competitiveness?
- nl: general increase of fragmentation;




Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Germania




Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Spagna



Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Italia




Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Polonia




Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Gran Bretagna


Increasing divergence...



Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Francia




Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Paesi Bassi




Increasing fragmentation, but on understandable issues...

Frammentazione (N_{eff}) - Austria




Increasing divergence?


- **“Minor” parties may develop in NE as well as in EE;**
- **Key exception: where NE electoral system is strongly limiting, EE are a key opportunity;**
- **Such opportunity is only exploited in presence of strong competition.**




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Germania




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Spagna




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Italia




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Polonia




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Gran Bretagna




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Francia



Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Paesi Bassi




Bipartitismo (% prime due liste) - Austria




The pro/anti-European dimension

- Classification according to the PPMD (Party Policy in Modern Democracies) expert survey by Benoit & Laver (2006)
- Different issues:
 - a) EU: AUTHORITY: Favours INCREASING vs. REDUCING the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (all countries except France and Poland)
 - b) EU: LARGER/STRONGER: OPPOSES vs. FAVORS an expanded and stronger EU. (France)
 - c) EU JOINING: OPPOSES vs. FAVORS joining the European Union (Poland)
- ⇒ **0-20 scale** (after reversing b and c) of Anti-Europeanism
 - ⇒ **0-10,5: pro-European**
 - ⇒ **10,5-14,5: moderately anti-European**
 - ⇒ **14,5-20: anti-European**
- Some notes of caution:
 - Manual classifications were required for small or new parties
 - The nature of single parties and of the party systems affects the comparability across countries




The pro/anti-European dimension [BEFORE]

- Sometimes EE are the opportunity for the emergence/strengthening of anti-European parties (e.g. France '94, Poland '04)
- But sometimes anti-European parties start their trend in national elections (e.g. Netherlands beginning '00s, Austria, UK)



The pro/anti-European dimension [AFTER]


- Opportunity/competition scheme:
Anti-European parties develop in NE as well as in EE:
but key role of NE electoral system in differentiating trends.





Germany

SPD defeat, but success of FDP and Grüne

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Germania - Elezioni Europee




Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Germania - Elezioni Politiche





Spain

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Spagna - Elezioni Europee




Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Spagna - Elezioni Politiche





Italy

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Italia - Elezioni Europee




Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Italia - Elezioni Politiche





Poland

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Polonia - Elezioni Europee




Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Polonia - Elezioni Politiche




UK

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Gran Bretagna - Elezioni Europee



Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Gran Bretagna - Elezioni Politiche




**Defeat of both Lab and Lib;
Stable UKIP;
Success of the BNP.**

**Opportunities for UKIP
in the next general elections?**


**- PRO: Labour crisis opens
role for "third" parties;**

**- CON: higher turnout in
general elections could half the
UKIP percentages.**





France

Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Francia - Elezioni Europee



Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Francia - Elezioni Politiche




Netherlands


Similarity of electoral systems allows development of new parties also in NE;

NE2006 - EE2009: very high volatility, but EU issue areas unchanged;


-> EU matters?



**Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Paesi Bassi - Elezioni Europee**




**Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Paesi Bassi - Elezioni Politiche**




Austria

Hans-Peter Martin
EU issue party
explains differences,
but still within
EU issue borders


FPO+BZO => Martin



Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Austria - Elezioni Europee




Voti a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE
Austria - Elezioni Politiche




Opportunities and outcomes for anti-EU parties

- Opportunity/competition scheme;
- Increase of competitiveness (new opportunities in the public opinion: see e.g. Kriesi);
- Volatility role of EU issue “borders” in some countries could reveal an emerging relevance of EU issues;




Governing parties' strength in EE


- Indicator: difference of government parties' vote share (EE – NE)
- The electoral cycle matters: the (mostly negative) difference between EE and NE is higher as the government reaches the middle of the electoral cycle
- A quadratic model [Schmitt 2005]




Governing parties' strength in EE (2004)



[Schmitt 2005]




Governing parties' strength in EE (2009)




Interpretation:

the economic crisis prevented “late cycle” governments from entering the redistribution phase



Public opinion: government/opposition


- Trends showed:
 - Government/opposition
 - Instability in the trend Netherlands, Poland, UK
 - Stability in the other countries
 - Pro/anti Europe:
 - Where government support varies, there is also some variation in pro/anti Europe support
- The results?
 - Role of the crisis?
 - Are less socially acceptable parties underestimated?





Germany

SPD defeat

Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Germania




Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Germania




Spain


Problem with undeclared intentions



Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Spagna




Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Spagna





Italy

Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Italia




Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Italia





Poland

Higher instability;
Government
overrepresentation;


Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Polonia




Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Polonia



Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Gran Bretagna



Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Gran Bretagna




UK


Polls measured
NE voting intentions;

Instability;

Results worse than
at the beginning of the
crisis.





Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Francia




France

(Verts classified Mod, while Europe-Ecologie classified Pro)


Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Francia



Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Paesi Bassi



Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Paesi Bassi




Netherlands

High instability.
Results are worse than at the beginning of the crisis.

After a “rally around the government” effect, results (as in the UK, and partially in Poland) punish the government.


In these countries, the crisis seems to matter.




Austria

Overall stability:


polls measured
NE vote intentions



Intenzioni di voto a tre aree con diversi atteggiamenti verso l'UE - Austria




Intenzioni di voto ai partiti al governo - Austria



Conclusions

- Hyp1: in EE participation is lower than in NE
=> confirmed, but not really a further decrease,
except for higher turnout countries (it,fr);
- Hyp2: in EE voting concentration is lower than in NE
- Hyp3: in EE anti-European parties are stronger than in NE
 - ⇒ not confirmed;
 - ⇒ partial outliers: fr, uk
 - ⇒ interaction between electoral system and overall competitiveness.
- Hyp4: in EE governing parties are weaker than in NE;
=> role of the electoral cycle: a possible weak point for the crisis;

- Hyp5: since autumn 2008 (economic crisis), governing parties weakened
 - it really happened in pl, nl, uk;
 - polls were able to anticipate, but only in terms of instability;
- Hyp6: since autumn 2008 (economic crisis), anti European parties strengthened
=> Not confirmed, except for the UK (possibly national reasons);




Concluding remarks

- EE "second-order" nature seems to be confirmed especially
 - as far as electoral participation
 - and government support (in the electoral cycle) are concerned
- As far as the dimensions of the party systems and the direction of voting, however
 - in FF voting concentration is not significantly lower than in NF
 - in EE anti-European parties are stronger than in NE only in some cases

with exceptions related to the opportunity/competition scheme

- Only in some countries (Netherlands, Poland, UK) governing parties' support changed since 2008
- It is hard to find any effect of the economic crisis on these trends and voting projections for 4-7 June **the countries where the results are below the pre-crisis**
- Except a strengthening of governing parties in the end of 2008 and then a decline since the beginning of 2009 ("Obama effect"?)
- Public opinion trends and voting behaviour of 4-7 June will very likely be affected only by national factors

in part, national expressions of crisis-related effects



Some doubts on the Kriesi proposal

- Europe is not a monopolist in managing both the economic and the cultural dimensions of demarcation vs. integration
- Economic dimension: demarcation vs. integration towards
 - other European countries => European integration
 - other non-European countries => globalization
- Cultural dimension: demarcation vs. integration towards
 - other European countries => European culture (Erasmus and ...? Media???)
 - other non-European countries => globalization of the media (“MTV hypothesis”)

