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Savings and Welfare / Employment Severance Indemnity and pension funds: how weak the new law is
The decree on supplementary national insurance of December 2005 closes a cycle of reforms of the Italian pension system – from that of Amato in 1992 to those of Dini in 1995, of Prodi in 1997 and of Maroni-Tremonti in 2004 – designed to correct the structural defects which undermined their sustainability. Right from the outset, the reform process was characterised by two parallel aims: 1) the correction of disequilibria, iniquities and distortions present in the public pillar; 2) the creation of a private pillar alongside the public one. Both welfare reform and the decree that completes it originated from the need to give the country a pension system capable of diversifying risk by entrusting a portion of national insurance accumulation to the capital market. In this context, the conditions to make the system work efficiently are not only freedom of choice but also good supervision and sanctions for non-transparent, unprofessional savings management.