- Ricerche e Progetti
- Biblioteca della Libertà
- Pubblicazioni e Working Paper
- Articoli e media
- Eventi e notizie
This article seeks to ascertain whether it is possible to reconcile the ideas of legal economists who believe that it is impossible to pursue equity by imposing single contractual clauses and those of classical legal scholars who assert that even contract law can and must be a tool for the promotion of social justice. Following the guidelines of the legal economist Richard Craswell, it stresses, first of all, how the passing on of legal costs does not always harm all consumers. Hypothesising consumers with heterogeneous preferences, it highlights the possibility of granting advantages to some by imposing contractual clauses which legal economists would define as inefficient. Secondly, it emphasises how some interventions that legal economists justify in terms of efficiency might be approved by classic legal scholars in terms of equity. Hence the ambiguity whereby the opposition of equity and efficiency typical of economists and legal economists might obscure the fact that what classical legal scholars call equity is what scholars inspired by the principles of economics regard as efficiency. Bearing this ambiguity in mind, it is possible in many cases to reconcile the position of legal economists with that of classical legal scholars.