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Using the instruments of the economic analysis of law, the author examines the rules of extracontractual liability – in particular the one on the circulation of vehicles – from the point of view of the subjective factor and the minimum standard of conduct. The purpose of the analysis is to verify, for the purposes of efficiency of allocation, whether it is preferable to adopt the rule of liability by fault – whereby a person is bound to compensate damages caused to another, if they fails to prove that they have behaved diligently – or the rule of objective liability – whereby a person is considered in any case liable for damage caused to another. The author finds the answer to this question by examining possible situations which pose the problem of extracontractual liability and the choice between liability by fault and objective liability. He then goes on to analyse Pigou’s theory, focusing his attention on the assessment of external economies and diseconomies. He then examines Coase’s theorem from the point of view of the allocation of costs resulting from harmful activities, framing the mechanisms of civil liability within an analytical context which takes into account the role played by informational asymmetries and transaction costs. Game theory leads the author to the conclusion that, in so far as it promotes respect for written and cautionary rules, the principle of subjective liability – i.e., by fault – generates more predictable conduct and hence, within the game theory approach, increases respect for the rules and reduces the chance of accidents. As such, it is preferable to the objective liability theorem.