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This article contains a critical analysis of the theory of justice formulated by John Rawls in his famous book of the same name, and recently reiterated with basically minor alterations in Political Liberalism. Boudon has two main objections to make against Rawls’s theory. First, he argues that the American philosopher’s conception of liberalism in Political Liberalism is now so threadbare as to be virtually meaningless – so much so that it might even be termed as no more than the liberalism of the man in the street. Secondly, Boudon questions Rawls’s theory’s assumption of reflexive equilibrium, of agreement, that is, with the alleged perceptions of common sense. Boudon cites a series of experiments to demonstrate that Rawls’s solution to the problem of social justice – the so called ‘maximin solution’ – is by no means the one that enjoys the greatest intuitive consensus: on the contrary, it proves to have only a minority following. Boudon concludes with a question: is it really imaginable for us to content ourselves with a procedural theory of justice without even attempting reflection on the legitimacy of its ends?